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Abstract. The study of social justice asks: what sorts of social arrangements
are equitable ones? But also: how do we derive the inequitable arrangements
we often observe in human societies? In particular, in spite of explicitly stated
equity norms, categorical inequity tends to be the rule rather than the excep-
tion. The cultural Red King hypothesis predicts that differentials in group size
may lead to inequitable outcomes for minority groups even in the absence of
explicit or implicit bias. We test this prediction in an experimental context
where subjects divided into groups engage in repeated play of a bargaining
game. We ran 14 trials involving a total of 112 participants. The results of
the experiments are statistically significant and suggestive: individuals in mi-
nority groups in these experiments end up receiving fewer resources than those
in majority groups. Combined with previous theoretical findings, these results
give some reason to think that the cultural Red King may occur in real human
groups.
1. Introduction
The study of social justice asks: what sorts of social arrangements are equitable
ones? But also: how do we derive the inequitable arrangements we often observe
in human societies? In particular, often in spite of explicitly stated equity norms,
categorical inequity tends to be the rule rather than the exception.1 Wherever
humans recognize social categories—gender, race, religion etc.—status inequities,
power inequities, and economic inequities tend to emerge across these divisions.
There are many reasons such inequities emerge. In this paper we devise an exper-
iment to test one mechanism that has been proposed to explain the emergence of
minority disadvantage in particular—the cultural Red King effect.
This effect was first described by political philosopher Justin Bruner, who uses
evolutionary game theoretic methods to show how minority groups can be disad-
vantaged in the emergence of bargaining conventions solely by dint of their group
1 Adams and Freedman (1976); Freedman and Montanari (1980) discuss the prevalence of equity
norms. Tilly et al. (1998) describes research on the prevalence of categorical inequity.
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size (Bruner 2017). As he shows, in groups with completely symmetric prefer-
ences, abilities, and resources, minority status alone can increase the likelihood
that individuals end up with fewer economic resources. The driver behind this
effect is a learning asymmetry between minority and majority groups. While mi-
nority members commonly meet their out-group, the reverse is not true. As a
result, members of a minority will more quickly learn to interact with their out-
group.2 In situations where this learning is about bargaining interactions, this
often proves disadvantageous. Low, accommodating demands tend to be more
safe in bargaining interactions, meaning that swift learners should adopt these
demands. Once this is done, members of the majority group can take advantage
of this accommodation.
Subsequent work has shown that this effect arises robustly in cultural evolution-
ary models (O’Connor 2017; O’Connor and Bruner 2017). Given the simplicity of
these models, though, a further question arises: can the cultural Red King really
occur in human groups? If so, there are important consequences for political phi-
losophy. To give one example, consider accounts of social justice that appeal to
historical justice in the sense outlined by Nozick (1974). The general idea is that
distributions of wealth derived from just processes are just.3 The models men-
tioned represent individuals who gain access to goods by willingly entering into
bargaining agreements, in doing so employing strategies that best benefit them
given their social arrangement. We might well want to describe the interactions
they engage in as just ones. And yet, under these conditions entire classes of
people end up disadvantaged for no reason besides their minority status.4
Of course, as noted, highly simplified models of social interaction cannot usu-
ally be taken at face value as explaining real social phenomena. One important
epistemic role they can play is directing attention to processes that might be oc-
curring in the real world, and which merit further empirical investigation. For
this reason, we study the cultural Red King effect in the laboratory. In partic-
ular, we draw on tools from experimental economics. These allow us to create
an environment where actors in groups bargain for real money, and where the
2 There is some relation here to inversion thesis from standpoint epistemology. The idea there
is that sometimes those in oppressed groups have special access to knowledge or epistemic
privilege (Wylie 2013). In Bruner’s models, minority groups learn more quickly about their
social situation.
3 Nozick (1974) in particular requires that such distributions derive from just initial acquisitions
of goods and just transfers of holdings, though he does not do much fill in the details of what
justice here entails.
4 Many thanks to Nick Adams and Mike Ashfield for this point.
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only asymmetry between them is group size. In this way, we are able to control
conditions so that if we systematically see an advantage arising for large groups,
we can conclude that the cultural Red King can potentially occur among human
actors.
In this study, we found support for the cultural Red King effect. Members of
minority groups ended up earning less money than those in majority groups on
average. And this difference emerged over the course of an experiment where indi-
viduals learned to bargain. Further investigation will be important in confirming
the significance of this effect to the real world. But given the theoretical work
underpinning the result, there is reason to think that minority status alone can
confer bargaining disadvantage to real world groups.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we introduce some preliminaries
necessary to describe both the theoretical and experimental results on the cultural
Red King that we discuss in this paper. In particular, we give a brief overview of
the game theoretic and evolutionary game theoretic methods used to first describe
the cultural Red King, followed by an overview of the basic tenets of experimental
economics. In section 3, we move on to describe the cultural Red King effect, and
the conditions under which it is expected to arise. We also state our experimental
predictions more fully. Section 4 describes our experimental setup, and in 5 we
give our findings. In section 6 we conclude.
2. Preliminaries: Game Theory, Evolutionary Game Theory, and
Experimental Economics
The cultural evolutionary pathways that lead to the emergence of norms are
notoriously difficult to investigate empirically. In particular, norms emerge among
many individuals over long time scales. As such, many have turned to formal
models to illuminate such pathways. Evolutionary game theory in particular has
been useful in showing how certain norms or conventions might have emerged.
Game theoretic models start with a simplified representation of some strategic
situation of interest. These games include the players involved in the strategic
interaction, the possible strategies they might employ, and payoffs which represent
how much each player values each of the outcomes. Game theorists generally
explain outcomes or predict which outcomes to expect based on what rational
decision makers would choose. For example, the concept of a Nash equilibrium, a
combination of strategies where no actor can gain a better payoff by unilaterally
changing their strategy, is often employed to explain strategic behavior.
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Evolutionary game theory adds to these elements a dynamics, or description
of how strategies might change over time, allowing evolutionary game theorists
to explain the emergence of cultural norms as the result of some sort of learning
process. Evolutionary game theorists generally explain outcomes or predict which
outcomes to expect based on how likely they are to emerge as stable endpoints,
or equilibria, of various learning processes. As will become clear in the next
section, this framework has been very useful to modelers interested in explaining
categorical inequity.
While experiments in philosophy often make use of methods from psychology,
here we use methods of experimental economics, which are well-suited to test
predictions from evolutionary game theoretic models. The cornerstone of experi-
mental economics is induced valuation, where subjects’ payment is determined by
their (and, generally, also other subjects’) decision making during the experiment
(Smith 1976). The idea behind induced valuation is to ensure that subjects care
about the outcomes of the strategic interaction in the laboratory and make real
decisions in pursuit of outcomes. In this way, experimenters can draw conclusions
about what subjects actually do in certain situations (rather that what subjects
report they will do) (Croson 2005).
Another important feature of experimental economics is that these experiments
tend to be, by and large, context-free. That is, the strategic situations are pre-
sented to subjects in a way that is as abstract as possible, without framing or
reference to real world examples. This is done in order to avoid subjects bringing
in preconceived notions about what the outcomes should be. So, for instance,
our experiment is not framed in terms of investigating discrimination or inequity:
this could make subjects less likely to request high amounts of resource as a result
of cultural norms or ethical concerns, rather than being motivated purely by the
payoffs of the game.
A final feature of experimental economics is that, as a rule, experimenters do not
deceive their subjects. This no deception rule is important because subjects have
to believe the strategic structure presented to them is really the structure they are
making decisions within. For instance, subjects often believe that experimenters
actively try to minimize what they pay their subjects (Cooper 2014). Subjects in
our experiment must believe that they are interacting with other subjects, rather
than thinking the experimenter is manipulating outcomes, so that the norm that
evolves reflects real learning in response to the behavior of others.
ON THE EMERGENCE OF MINORITY DISADVANTAGE 5
3. Theory and Predictions
We will proceed by first describing the general theory behind the cultural Red
King effect. Then we will turn to the more specific theory underlying our experi-
mental design. We will use this to outline our experimental predictions.
3.1. Theory. According to the Red Queen hypothesis in biology, fast evolving
species can gain an advantage over slow evolving ones. In a predator-prey interac-
tion, for example, it is good to quickly evolve an extra burst of speed.5 Biologists
Bergstrom and Lachmann (2003) were the first to describe what they call the Red
King effect using evolutionary game theoretic models. As they show, in species
engaged in mutualistic interactions, counter-intuitively, slow evolving species can
sometimes gain an advantage.
One feature of many mutualisms is that there are a variety of ways to ‘split’
or share out the benefits of the mutualism. Consider ants who farm aphids, for
example. The aphids reap benefits related to protection from predators, and food
supply. In return, they secrete a sugary nectar for the ants. But how much
nectar does each aphid provide for how much protection? As Bergstrom and
Lachmann (2003) show, sometimes the species that evolves slower does better.
This occurs when a fast evolving species evolves accommodating behaviors, which
their mutualistic partners then come to take advantage of. One intuitive way
to understand this effect is via appeal to an analogous rational choice situation
described by Schelling (1980). Suppose two people are playing chicken with their
cars. They speed towards each other. Neither wishes to be the one to swerve,
but if they both keep going straight, they crash. A way to win this game is to
visibly throw your steering wheel out the window. Any sane opponent will then
decide to swerve, forfeiting the game. In this case, an individual makes themselves
incapable of changing strategies, and gains an advantage. We can think of the
Red King effect as resulting from a kind of intransigence that forces a mutualistic
partner to swerve in evolutionary time.
How does this relate to minority disadvantage? Bruner (2017) uses evolutionary
game theory to derive a formally similar effect in a cultural evolutionary scenario
where two groups develop bargaining norms, and one group is in the minority. This
occurs as a result of a fundamental asymmetry between the interactive experiences
of individuals in minority and majority groups. Minority members, by dint of
5 This hypothesis is named after the Red Queen in Lewis Carrol’s Through the Looking Glass.
She tells Alice, “Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same
place”.
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small size, are constantly meeting their out-group for interaction. The majority,
on the other hand, only rarely meets their out-group. This means that we should
expect minority members to much more quickly learn how to interact with their
out-group than vice versa. In other words, when it comes to cultural evolution,
minority groups will be fast-evolving ones. As Bruner (2017) shows, this can
lead to minority disadvantage. A number of papers have tested the robustness
of this effect across different games, interactive structures, learning strategies,
and modeling choices (Bruner 2017; O’Connor and Bruner 2017; O’Connor 2017;
Rubin and O’Connor 2018; O’Connor et al. 2017). As these authors show, the
cultural Red King effect emerges robustly in evolutionary models as a direct result
of the minority-majority asymmetry just described. It is this body of literature
that inspires the experimental work presented here.
It will be useful, for what follows, to develop a deeper understanding of this
effect using evolutionary game theory as a framework. First we can ask: what sorts
of strategic situations are the ones where the cultural Red King effect potentially
occurs? To see the cultural Red King effect, we need a strategic scenario where
1) two groups culturally interact and develop conventions 2) there are multiple
evolutionary outcomes or equilibria that can emerge and 3) there is a conflict in
preferences over these equilibria for the two groups involved.
Figure 1 shows an example of a game that meets these conditions. It is often
called the Nash demand game, and is the primary game used by all the authors who
have modeled the cultural Red King to date.6 The idea is that two individuals
bargain to divide a resource. Each demands some portion of it. If they make
compatible demands, they each get what they asked for. If their demands are
incompatible in that they over-demand the resource, it is assumed that they are
unable to peaceably split the resource, and each gets a low payoff.
In particular, this figure shows a ‘mini-game’ where we assume there is a re-
source of 10, and each actor can only make a Low, Med, or High demand for 4, 5,
or 6 of the resource.7 This minimal structure is a simple way to capture a scenario
where there are multiple ways to divide a resource which may favor either of the
6 This game was first introduced by Nash (1950), and has subsequently been used to represent
countless scenarios of resource division—salary decisions, international trade agreements, bar-
gaining over household labor, etc. It has also been called divide the dollar, divide the pie, divide
the cake, the Nash bargaining game, or just the bargaining game.
7 Sigmund et al. (2001) introduce the term ‘mini-game’ and defend the usefulness of small,
simple game theoretic models. In the case of evolutionary bargaining models there is a long
history of using mini-games to capture bargaining scenarios as in Skyrms (1994); Axtell et al.
(2000).
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Figure 1. A payoff table for a Nash demand game with demands
4, 5, and 6 and a resource of 10. Payoffs for player 1 are listed first.
players involved. Rows represent the strategies for player 1 and columns for player
2. Each entry in the table represents the payoffs for one outcome with player 1
listed first. So, for example, if player 1 demands 6 and player 2 demands 4, they
get 6 and 4 respectively. If they both demand 6, they over-demand the resource
and each receives a low payoff of 0.
There are three pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game—the outcomes where
player 1 demands High and player 2 Low, where player 1 demands Low and 2 High,
and where both players demand Med.8 At these outcomes, the entire resource is
perfectly divided. If either player demands more they exceed the resource and get
nothing. If either demands less, they get less. Notice that one of these equilibria,
the Med-Med one, is ‘fair’ in the sense that each player gets the same payoff. The
other two are ‘unfair’ in that one player gets more. If we imagine two groups who
learn a convention where one side always demands High and the other Low, we
have a simple representation of something like discrimination—individuals treat
members of the two groups differently, to the detriment of one group.
Let us translate this game into an evolutionary model. Suppose we have two
groups that make up one population. Let the majority group constitute propor-
tion p of the population and the minority group 1 − p where p ≥ .5. For each
individual, suppose that they condition their strategy on the group membership
of the individual they interact with. For instance, Karen might always play Low
with in-group members and High with out-group members. The work cited above
has shown that in most evolutionary models such a population will evolve to one
of three stable outcomes between the two groups, which reflect the Nash equilibria
of the underlying game. We can think of these as representing culturally evolved
conventions—patterns of behavior that emerge over time to solve social problems.
8 Pure strategies are those where the actors always take the same action rather than probabilis-
tically mixing. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, but it does not emerge
in the evolutionary models we will describe.
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In the ‘fair’ convention, everybody demands Med of their out-group. In the two
discriminatory conventions, one side always demands High when they meet an
out-group member, and the other side always demands Low.9
We can now say much more precisely what the cultural Red King effect looks
like in an evolutionary game theoretic model. As a group’s size (1−p) gets smaller,
if their likelihood of ending up at a lower payoff equilibrium increases, we see the
cultural Red King. (In a minute, it will become clear what we mean by ‘likelihood’
here.) Again, this occurs because in bargaining scenarios, low, accommodating
demands are broadly successful. Regardless of what your opponent is doing, you
guarantee yourself some payoff by being accommodating. This means that in
many cases, both groups will start to learn to accommodate. But since minority
groups learn this lesson more quickly, at some point the majority group begins
to learn that they can do better by taking advantage of this accommodating
behavior. Eventually this process tends to lead to conventions of bargaining that
advantage the majority.
Figure 2 shows this effect for a particular model. We run simulations of two
groups culturally evolving to play the Nash demand game from figure 1. We em-
ploy the most commonly used dynamics in evolutionary game theory, the repli-
cator dynamics, to model change.10 An understanding of the details of these
dynamics is not crucial here, but they work by expanding strategies that do well
and contracting those that do poorly.11 Each data point in this figure shows, for
some value of p, how often each possible equilibrium emerged. As is evident, as
p increases three things happen. First, the fair equilibrium becomes less likely
to emerge. Second, the equilibrium where the minority population discriminates
becomes less likely. And third, the equilibrium where the majority discriminates
becomes increasingly likely. It should be clear now, what it means for a group
9 Notice that these three outcomes are the population level equilibria between groups in the
model described. I.e., in a population playing these strategies, no individuals may change their
between-group strategy and improve their payoff. In these models, conventional behavior also
emerges within each of the two in-groups. Usually this involves everyone treating each other
fairly. Sometimes ‘fractious’ patterns emerge where some individuals demand High and others
Low (Skyrms 1994).
10 Taylor and Jonker (1978) introduce the replicator dynamics to model evolution by natural
selection, but they have also often been used as a good representation of cultural change. In
particular, they are equivalent to the average expected population change of explicitly cultural
evolutionary and learning models (Weibull 1997; Bo¨rgers and Sarin 1997; Hopkins 2002). Since
this is a simulation, we employ the discrete time version of the dynamics adapted to a two
population model where all individuals interact and the populations are of different sizes.
11 For more on this particular model see O’Connor (2018a).
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Figure 2. A plot showing the cultural Red King effect for a Nash
demand game with demands 4, 5, and 6. The x-axis tracks ma-
jority proportion. Each line tracks the proportion of simulations
that ended up at each of three possible equilibria. As majority size
increases, the minority is increasingly disadvantaged.
to become more likely to end up disadvantaged as a result of the cultural Red
King—it is a more probable outcome of an evolutionary scenario.
This effect is of obvious interest from a cultural standpoint. The models indi-
cate that minority groups may be prone to disadvantage in situations of resource
division and bargaining by dint of size alone. Of course, real world discrimination
involves factors that go far beyond what is represented in these models includ-
ing psychological phenomena related to bias, stereotyping, and stereotype threat
(Ogbu 1978; Stewart 2010). This said, the cultural Red King effect may nonethe-
less contribute to discrimination. The modeling work discussed is also important
in showing how little is needed to generate discrimination. For instance, anti-bias
training may not be enough to ensure equity when basic cultural evolutionary
processes, like the cultural Red King, lead to inequity (Stewart 2010; O’Connor
2018a,b).
There is another result to mention, which is that for different versions of this
model we can actually see minority advantage. Some payoff structures mean that
it makes the most sense for minority members to quickly learn high demands.
Once they do so, majority members do best to make complementary low demands.
This cultural Red Queen is described at further length by Bruner (2017). However,
O’Connor (2017, 2018a) argues that under common conditions, including risk
aversion, out-group bias, and pre-existing discriminatory norms, the culture Red
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Figure 3. The payoff table used in the experiment. Payoffs are
listed with player 1 first.
King effect is stronger. This increases worries that the cultural Red King might
influence real world populations.
3.2. Predictions. Let us now turn to the particular model we employ in this
experiment and the relevant theoretical predictions. Our goal was to create the
most highly simplified set-up that could still reproduce the cultural Red King. In
particular, we wanted to isolate the relevant effect by reducing the chances that
cultural norms and cognitive biases influenced participant behavior.
One choice along these lines involved using a Nash demand game where the ‘fair’
demand was removed. Humans show strong inclinations towards fair behavior in
laboratory experiments, even when real-world behavior is far from fair (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999). There is some debate over whether this inclination derives from
cultural norms for fairness, or an innate aversion towards inequity (Binmore and
Shaked 2010; Fehr and Schmidt 2010). Whatever the root of this behavior, we
force participants to choose between unequal demands to avoid the psychological
pull of fairness. The payoff table we use is displayed in figure 3. The particular
demands—4 and 6—were chosen as ones where the cultural Red King effect should
be particularly strong.12 There are two pure Nash equilibria of this simplified
game. These are the strategy pairings where player 1 demands 6 and player 2
demands 4 and vice versa. In evolutionary models, we thus expect groups to
evolve to one of the discriminatory outcomes described where one group always
demands 6 and the other 4. Of course, excluding the fair demand from the game
here means that the results may not apply as directly to real world scenarios
where fairness is an option.
We also chose an interactive structure that was as simple as possible. Above
we have described models where individuals interact with both in-group and out-
group members and condition their strategies based on the group membership
of their partners. Here we only consider between-group interactions. In other
words, subjects only interact with their out-group and never their in-group. (As
12 See Bruner (2017); O’Connor (2017) for a more in-depth explanation.
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will become clear in the next section, this meant that majority group members
would not interact in every round.) This choice creates a scenario that replicates
asymmetries in interaction and learning speed between groups, while avoiding the
complications involved in learning both in- and out-group strategies.
The body of literature cited in 3.1 predicts a cultural Red King effect for a
majority and minority group learning to interact in many bargaining games. This
prediction is based on a large class of models, employing various learning dynamics
and population structures. This said, we can also verify that the cultural Red King
effect arises in models tuned to the particular parameters used in this experiment.
To that effect, we have produced an agent-based model where agents play the
game from figure 3. We represent eight agents (again matching the experimental
protocol) and vary the size of the minority group.13 Eventually this model always
evolves to one of the equilibrium states—the majority group always demands 6
and the minority 4, or vice versa. And, indeed, the larger the majority group, the
greater the chance they evolve to demand 6. The results of this simulation are
shown in 4. As described in the next section, we ran experiments of groups with
6 majority members and 2 minority members. This majority group size results in
65% of simulations evolving to the majority advantage equilibrium for this model.
We emphasize, though, that one should not take the particular value here very
seriously. The match between the model and real human learning behavior is not
a tight one. Rather, this little simulation is simply intended to demonstrate to the
reader that the cultural Red King effect is indeed expected to emerge in a model
with parameter settings that are similar to those we employ in the experiment.
As mentioned, the prediction for this experiment is drawn from a broad set of
results that are robust over many models making different assumptions.
Notice that this model, and previous ones, predict that each run ends up at
a very clear convention where all members of a group take the same strategy.
We do not expect such homogeneity in real groups. Human strategic behavior
is highly stochastic. Instead, previous experiments using the laboratory to test
13 In this particular model, we give each agent a limited memory of past interaction. Each
round we randomly choose agents for interaction. They select whatever strategy would perform
best against their memories. For example, an agent with many memories of their out-group
playing High will do best to respond by playing Low. This agent-based model is based off an
influential analytic modeling paradigm used by Young (1993) to investigate bargaining between
groups. Axtell et al. (2000) develop an agent-based version of the model, and O’Connor (2017)
demonstrates the cultural Red King effect in this agent-based version. The choice of dynamics
here is somewhat arbitrary. We used this learning rule since it has been previously used to
explore the cultural Red King, but results will be qualitatively robust across many rules.
12 ON THE EMERGENCE OF MINORITY DISADVANTAGE
Figure 4. Results from a simulation of an agent-based model
demonstrating the cultural Red King effect for parameter values
fit to the experimental settings. The results show the proportion of
runs of simulation that end up at a convention where the majority
group demands 6 and the minority 4.
evolutionary game theoretic predictions have yielded results that are messy but
generally match trends in evolutionary models, rather than perfect model-world
correlation.14
We can now state our main theoretical prediction.
Prediction 1: We predict that for experimental subjects playing the game in
figure 3 and sorted into a minority and majority group, the majority individu-
als will demand High more often, and receive higher payoffs than the minority
individuals as a result of the cultural Red King effect.
We make one further prediction. The cultural Red King emerges, in all models
studied, over the course of learning. Therefore we should expect in our experi-
ments for the difference in frequency of demanding Low between the two groups
to increase as the experiment continues.
Prediction 2: We predict that the difference in frequency of demands between
the two groups will increase over the course of the experiment, with the minority
receiving relatively lower payoffs at the end than at the beginning.
14 See, for example, Blume et al. (1998); Bruner et al. (2018) who find that subjects in the
lab conform to evolutionary predictions in the signaling game, but by no means accord to the
perfect conventions predicted.
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4. Experimental Setup
Our experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen et al. 2016) and conducted
both online using Amazon Mechanical Turk and at the Experimental Social Sci-
ence Laboratory at the University of California, at Irvine, where participants were
drawn from a pool of undergraduate and graduate students.
For the experiment, participants were asked to play the simplified Nash demand
game described in section 3.2. The experiment was run for 14 sessions, each of
which involved eight participants interacting over 100 rounds of play. In total,
112 individuals participated in the experiment.
The first ten sessions were run online at Amazon Turk. Participants were
screened for the experiments by running a preliminary HIT (human intelligence
task) which was available only to Amazon Turk workers who had previously com-
pleted at least 100 HITs with a 90% approval rate (so as to ensure participant
reliability) and which provided a tutorial explaining the structure of the game,
and then asked comprehension questions to test whether participants clearly un-
derstood the payoffs to themselves and their opponents for each combination of
demands. Participants who answered all questions correctly were then invited to
participate in the experimental session.
The last four sessions were run in the laboratory. (As we will describe, this
was necessitated by a software change on the part of Amazon Turk.) Before each
laboratory session, participants were asked to sit at a randomly assigned com-
puter terminal where they would play games with the other participants. Before
the session, participants were provided with a tutorial explaining the structure
of the game. Just as with the Amazon Turk experiments, individuals were asked
comprehension questions to confirm that they had clearly understood the payoffs
to themselves and their opponents for each combination of demands. In the lab,
we were not able to filter for only individuals who answered all the comprehension
questions correctly. That said, the risk for inattention in Amazon Turk partici-
pants is typically far greater than those in the laboratory, and most participants
(91%) in the laboratory sessions did in fact answer all questions correctly.
All else was identical in the implementation of the Amazon Turk and laboratory
versions of the experiments, with only the difference that participants in the former
setup were (typically) at computers in their homes while participants in the latter
setup were at computer terminals in the laboratory. Importantly, as we will discuss
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in section 5, there was no significant difference in the results of the laboratory and
online setups.
At the start of each session, participants were randomly and permanently as-
signed to either a majority group of six individuals or to a minority group of
two individuals. In each round, members of each group were randomly matched
with members of the opposing group. There were no in-group interactions. Thus,
participants in the minority group played for all 100 rounds while participants in
the majority group played an average of 33 rounds. In rounds where majority
members did not play, they were given a screen instructing them to wait.
Importantly, individuals were not informed of the group to which they were
assigned, or even of the presence of any groups at all. This was done to isolate
the desired causal factors. It is well known that framing interactions in terms of
groups can elicit strong behavioral responses (Tajfel 1970). We did not wish to
invite such responses. Instead, our aim was to isolate the effect of differentials in
the frequency of interaction between groups of different sizes on the propensity to
arrive at inferior outcomes.
In each round of play, each individual involved in the round chose her action
and observed the payoff she received given the combination of her action and the
action of her opponent. Having observed her opponent’s action as well as both
her payoff and her opponent’s payoff, each participant could choose to adjust her
strategy in the next round of play. Note that, in keeping with the context-free
nature of much of experimental economics, we did not refer to these actions as
‘demands’ during the experiment. Instead, subjects were told they could either
‘choose 6‘ or ‘choose 4’. This was done so as to minimize the effect of social norms
or contextual rules (e.g. ‘avoid being too demanding in your social interactions’),
which could influence their decision making.15 Screenshots of the experiment
introduction, instructions, understanding questions, and decision pages can be
found in Appendix C.
All participants received a baseline of $7 for participation in the experiment.
Additionally, to incentivize strategic behavior, participants were able to earn more
based on their performance. Participants were made aware of this fact and of the
details of how this would be done. For each participant, at the conclusion of
her 100 rounds of play, five rounds would be selected at random and her average
payoff for those five rounds—which could range from $0 to $6—would be added
15 Though, see section 6 for a discussion of how subjects’ decision making might still have been
affected by inequity aversion.
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to her final payment.16 Participants typically completed all 100 rounds within 30
minutes in both laboratory and online experiments. Online, participants were paid
through Amazon within a day of completing the session, and in the laboratory
participants were paid in cash immediately after each session.
As mentioned, 10 session were conducted on Amazon Turk and 4 sessions in
the laboratory. This was necessary because Amazon Turk changed its software
partway through our experiments in a way that made our existing experimental
design—one that required simultaneous coordinated interactions between groups
of individuals—impractical to implement. There are some demographic differ-
ences between the Amazon Turk subject pool and the laboratory subject pool.
In short, the Amazon Turk subject pool tends to be more diverse than labora-
tory subject pools composed of graduate and undergraduate students. Previous
studies, though, have shown that Turk studies tend to produce quality data on
par with that of the student pools at university laboratories (Buhrmester et al.
2011; Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Kees et al. 2017). Thus, when experimental
hypotheses do not depend on the demographic differences that exist between these
two pools, studies can be validly performed on one or both subject pools.
Importantly, for our experimental predictions we require only that individuals
be responsive to incentives in such a way that they try to improve their payoffs and
that they learn through repeated interactions. These requirement are not sensitive
to demographic changes between the Amazon Turk and laboratory subject pools
and should hold just as well in both cases.
5. Results and Analysis
We will proceed by addressing the theoretical predictions made in section 3.
Our first prediction was that groups size differences on their own would drive
minority group disadvantage. To test this, we formulate appropriate null and
alternative hypotheses as follows:
Prediction 1: Minority Group Disadvantage
H0 : Minority groups will not end up playing ‘demand low’ with greater mean
frequency than majority groups.
16 Random selection of rounds for payment after an experiment is used to prevent known dis-
tortions in subject behavior that occur as participants perceive their level of wealth to change
(Davis and Holt 1993).
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Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
x¯min 0.68 0.9 0.53 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.85 0.8 1 0.78 0.73 1 0.5 0.3
x¯maj 0.33 0.44 0.65 0.58 0.44 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.26 0.82 0.46 0.08 0.53 0.71
x¯d 0.34 0.46 -0.12 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.43 0.33 0.74 -0.05 0.27 0.92 -0.03 -0.41
Table 1. Frequency of ‘demand low’ strategy in the final 20 rounds
of play (of 100 total rounds) by group over the 14 sessions. The first
row displays the frequency for the minority group, the second for the
majority group, and the third displays the difference in frequency
between the groups. Sessions 1-10 were run on Amazon Mechanical
Turk and sessions 11-14 in the ESSL lab at UC Irvine.
H1 : Minority groups will end up playing ‘demand low’ with greater mean
frequency than majority groups.
To assess these, we compare the mean frequency of the ‘demand low’ strategy
for each group in the final twenty rounds of play to test if there is a statistically
significant difference.
In nine of our fourteen sessions the minority group ended up playing ‘demand
low’ more frequently than the majority group. The mean frequencies in question
are reported for all fourteen sessions in Table 1. (Sessions 1-10 were performed
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and 11-14 in the lab.) In seven of these sessions,
the difference in frequency of low demands between the minority and majority
group was larger than 0.25. For reference, only once did the majority group end
up making low demands with such a differential.17
Results are stochastic, but this is what we expect given previous work on game
theoretic behavior in the lab. In addition, we expect a variety of outcomes based
on our evolutionary models—where even under the cultural Red King the majority
group sometimes ends up disadvantaged. The theoretical prediction is that despite
this stochasticity we will see a tendency towards disadvantage for the minority
group.
Across the sessions, the minority group ended up playing ‘demand low’ in the fi-
nal twenty rounds of the sessions with a mean frequency of 0.69 while the majority
group played ‘demand low’ with a mean frequency of 0.50. The mean difference
between the minority and majority groups in their frequency of playing ‘demand
17 All of the data from our experiments is registered at the Open Science Framework
(www.osf.io). The URL to the data repository is located in Appendix A.
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Figure 5. Difference in the mean frequency of play of the ‘demand
low’ strategy between the minority and majority groups for each
20-round period of the game across all experiments. Positive values
indicate that the minority group played ‘demand low’ with greater
frequency. The gray band displays the 95% confidence intervals.
low’ was 0.19 with a variance of 0.14. For our sample of 14 sessions, this yields
a p-value of 0.04, a power of 0.58, and a Bayes factor of 3.39 corresponding to
conventionally ‘substantial’ evidential support.
For our statistical test, we employ Student’s t-test on the differences of means
of the two groups with a standard α = 0.05 significance threshold. Thus, for our
test, if the null hypothesis is true, the probability of rejecting the null is 5%. And
if the alternative hypothesis is true, the probability of failing to reject the null
is 42%, given our effect size of 0.19. That is, the data support our theoretical
predictions and our result is significant but, given that it is also under-powered,
it should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive.
In figure 5 we see the difference in mean frequency across all sessions of the
‘demand low’ strategy between the minority and majority groups for each 20-
round period of the game. Plots of the evolution of group and individual frequency
of play over the course of each session can be found in Appendix B.
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A further prediction of our theory was that the difference in mean frequency
of playing ‘demand low’ should increase over repeated interactions. We can make
this precise by testing whether the mean difference in the last 20 rounds of play
was greater than the first 20 rounds of play.
Prediction 2: Progressive Disadvantage
H0 : The difference in mean frequency of minority groups and majority groups
playing ‘demand low’ will not increase over the course of play.
H1 : The difference in mean frequency of minority groups and majority groups
playing ‘demand low’ will increase over the course of play.
The mean difference between the groups in the first 20 rounds of play was 0.02.
That is, both minority and majority groups played ‘demand low’ in the first 20
rounds with essentially the same frequency. The mean difference between the
groups in the last 20 rounds of play was 0.19. That is, the minority groups played
‘demand low’ more frequently. This amounts to a mean increase of 0.17 with a
variance of 0.09 which yields a p-value of 0.027, a power of 0.63, and a Bayes
factor of 4.11 corresponding to conventionally ‘substantial’ evidential support.
That is, the difference in play increases over the course of play and the increase
is significant.
Addressing our concerns that the online and laboratory populations may be
different, we verify that their observed mean behavior is indeed quite close and
the difference is not statistically significant. In particular, the mean difference for
the online sessions (1-10) and laboratory sessions (11-14) is 0.1 with a standard
error of 0.23 yielding a p-value of 0.67. Thus, the evidence does not support a
hypothesis that the behavior of individuals in the online and laboratory contexts
is substantively distinct.
A close examination of individual play reinforces the insight that there is high
variance in individual behavior. Some participants began sessions by playing
‘demand low’ and persisted in doing so without ever experimenting with a more
aggressive strategy even when it would appear to have been beneficial to do so,
some began by playing ‘demand high’ and persisted in doing so even at cost to
themselves. Most participants exhibited a slight aversion to aggressive demands as
is demonstrated by the greater mean and median frequencies of the ‘demand low’
strategy. There are multiple plausible, distinct, compatible explanations for these
behaviors: picking a single strategy is appealingly easy; some individuals count
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on being able to bully others into submission; some individuals are mortified by
the thought of disadvantaging anyone; most individuals are disposed, by varying
degrees, to abide by (and enforce) equitable norms (Henrich et al. 2001).
This is all true. But what may be most impressive is that, in spite of the
endogenous variation in individual behavior, our results show that minority groups
do end up at payoff-inferior outcomes with significantly greater frequency. There
is a signal in the noise.
6. Conclusion
While we have found support for the cultural Red King hypothesis, there are a
few factors to consider which may have influenced our results. In particular, one
curious observation is that even when most of the minority group demands low,
not all members of the majority group consistently demand high (see, e.g., the
graphs for sessions 2, 7, 8, and 9 in Appendix B). The fact that majority group
members did not consistently learn to take full advantage of the lower demands
made by the minority group may partially explain why the Red King effect we
observed was not stronger.
There are a few possible explanations of this observation. While we kept the
experiment as context-free as possible, subjects could still have seen that their
‘choosing 6’ would, when the person they interacted with chose 4, lead to their
getting more than the other person. Therefore, subject decision making could still
have been affected by inequity aversion or other social norms regarding getting
more than one is due, leading majority group members to avoid making high
demands. Another possible explanation is that subjects in these majority groups
exhibited risk aversion, so that majority group members chose the safer option
of demanding low even when they could have maximized payoffs by demanding
high.
With respect to the applicability of the results presented here, there are many
causes of economic inequity. As mentioned, these include psychological factors
like racial and gender biases, and, potentially, stereotype threat. This paper has
investigated an additional factor—the cultural Red King—which could potentially
lead to minority disadvantage solely due to group size. While this effect cannot
be taken to explain any particular case of real world inequity on its own, it is
important to recognize that it may, indeed, contribute to inequitable patterns of
resource division.
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These results are relevant to potential interventions on inequity. For example,
many organizations train members in attempts to lessen the effects of racial and
gender bias. One worry is that such attempts may not be enough if an effect
like the cultural Red King, which results simply from self-interested learning in
bargaining scenarios, is at play. In such cases, because the dynamics of interaction
tend towards inequity, continued efforts to counteract these dynamics might be
necessary.
As mentioned in the introduction, the results here have implications for political
and social philosophy. As we pointed out, Nozick’s influential account of histor-
ical justice argues that distributions of goods that arise from just processes are
themselves just. In particular, he argues that such processes must involve a just
initial acquisition of holdings, and just transfers, but says relatively little about
what this involves. Kenneth Arrow, as early as 1978, introduced the following
worry about this account,
Suppose a dominant group, say whites or“Aryans”, agreed to trade
with the complementary minority only on very unfavorable terms.
Indeed, they might not have to agree in any concrete sense: suppose
each one happened for his own reasons to resolve to so act...Are we
to say that the results are just? (Arrow 1978, 272).
The worry raised by Arrow is that under Nozick’s account, it could be perfectly
just to have economic inequity tracking along social identities like race and gen-
der. The modeling work described in this paper, and the experiment presented,
deepen this worry significantly. Notice that we can interpret the models here as
respresenting joint action—actors produce a good and then divide it. Under this
interpretation, they obtain their good in a just way (through their own produc-
tion) and divide it justly (through a mutually agreeable bargain).
The problem then is not just that one group could possibly agree to only trade
with another unfavorably. Rather, under completely ubiquitous conditions this
sort of inequitable bargaining emerges naturally, and with high probability. The
dynamics of human interaction push us towards just this sort of inequity. It is not
that this could happen because of some bad actors, but that it likely will happen
whenever people recognize social categories, and learn to bargain together, even
absent racial or gender bias. Furthermore, features of the social world like minority
group size turn out to be highly relevant to determining ultimate distributions of
goods.
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We do not think this worry will necessarily sway those highly committed to
Nozick’s libertarian principles.18 Rather, we point out that one cannot hold to
historical justice, while also holding that gender and race should not be important
determinants of economic distributions. Historical processes tend to make them
so, unless we intervene. Philosophers will have to choose.
There is another more general lesson here for political philosophers who think
that establishing just processes is enough to guarantee justice. The lesson is that
it is important to actually investigate how social processes proceed, either through
models or experiments or both. It is counter-intuitive that group size alone could
influence distributions significantly, but the research presented here indicates that
it can. In other words, it may not be possible to fully understand the implications
of various processes from the armchair. One take-away is that if the outcomes
resulting from seemingly just processes tend to be inequitable in surprising ways,
it might not be possible to label processes as just without considering their actual
consequences.
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Appendix A. Experiment Data
All of the data from our experiments is registered at the Open Science Frame-
work and can be found, anonymized for review, at the following URL:
https://osf.io/mtc9f/
Appendix B. Plots of Individual and Group Behavior
Legend: Minority Group ( ); Majority Group ( ).
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Appendix C. Screenshots of the Experiment Interface
The first introduction and instructions screens.
The first understanding question and question solution screens.
The in-game decision and decision results screens.
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